# AMD PSP (Navi31 / RX 7900 XTX) — Security Review Findings Consolidated writeup of a reverse-engineering and vulnerability-hunting effort against the AMD Platform Security Processor firmware on a Radeon RX 7900 XTX, driven end-to-end on real hardware via tinygrad's userspace AMD driver (USB4 / ASM2464PD PCIe bridge). This is the top-level summary. Each claim links to a detailed doc in the parent `psp_out/` directory. Where a claim was later corrected, the correction is noted inline — several early hypotheses were disproved by hardware and are retained as retracted docs so the reasoning trail survives. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 1. Scope and what was reversed Six executable PSP modules were fully reverse engineered (0 unnamed functions each), with structs, prototypes, segment splits and per-function comments: | module | role | functions | ELF base | |---|---|---|---| | `sos` (sOS) | PSP microkernel + boot/TEE task | 526 | 0x0 | | `sys_drv` (SYS_DRV) | privileged system driver | 1141 | 0xE00100 | | `asd` (ASD) | display/HDCP service driver | 1562* | 0xD00100 | | `hdcp` (HDCP TA) | HDCP trusted application | 109 | 0x400100 | | `dtm` (DTM TA) | display topology manager TA | 14 | 0x400000 | | `ras` (RAS TA) | RAS/error-reporting TA | 119 | 0x400000 | *ASD total includes ~878 vtable veneers; ~684 are real functions. All symbols/structs/comments are exported in `symbols/*.json` and re-applied to a fresh IDB with `import_symbols.py` (see `README.md`). **Live firmware version:** SYS_DRV/sOS **0.49.0.54**, ASD 33.0.1.21, HDCP 23.0.0.82. Confirmed by the PSP version register `C2PMSG_58` and by matching the container tinygrad loads. (An earlier claim of ".53" was a mistake — a stale cache file was misidentified as the loaded image; see `FINDING-LIVE-VERSION-IS-53-NOT-54.md`, retracted.) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 2. Headline conclusion **No host-reachable, memory-corrupting, or disclosure primitive was found on the current firmware.** The host-facing attack surface was fully enumerated and every entry point's handlers audited. The firmware is well-built on the reachable surface: bounded copies, per-use buffer validation, snapshot-then-parse, a hardware-fenced trusted-memory region, and a tight SVC type gate. The only issues found are either **rollback-only and DoS-class**, or **real bugs that are not host-reachable**. Details below. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 3. The host-facing attack surface (fully characterised) | entry point | reachable? | verdict | |---|---|---| | **GFX ring / SVC 0xF2 RPCs** | yes | thoroughly audited, well-defended | | **INVOKE_CMD to TAs** | HDCP yes, ASD no | HDCP bugs display-gated / canary-blocked; ASD rejects host invokes (`0x4`) | | **C2P / AGESA mailbox** (~45 handlers) | **no** (runtime NAK stub) | boot-only / vestigial on a dGPU — `ATTACK-SURFACE.md` | | **TMR / trusted DRAM** | fenced | host reads `0xFF`, writes dropped (hardware-confirmed) | Key structural facts established: * **The 8-command GFX-ring allow-list is effectively dead code.** The host ring is drained by `bl_legacy_mailbox_loop`, which hardcodes `ring == 0xFFFF` and so bypasses `tee_cmd_allowed_on_ring`. Confirmed on hardware (cmd `0x26` reaches SYS_DRV). The reachable surface is ~30 SYS_DRV RPCs, not 8. (`ATTACK-SURFACE.md`) * **A compromised TA buys very little.** `sos_svc_dispatch` restricts process types 5/6 (TAs) to `SVC 0x75` (exit) plus `SVC >= 0xF0`. A TA cannot issue the memory-mapping or register SVCs at all, on any firmware version. The only type-ungated kernel entry, `sos_svc_body_f0` (SVC 0xF0-0xF5), is clean. (`AUDIT-TA-KERNEL-BOUNDARY.md`) * **The crypto service (SVC 0xF2 service 1) is DACR-confined** to the caller's MMU domain, so crypto-driven overflows stay TA-side by design. (`SERVICE1-CRYPTO-ANALYSIS.md`) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 4. Confirmed bugs and their true reach ### 4.1 HDCP TA stack overflow — real, host-reachable, but doubly blocked `memcpy(stack[268], sess+0x55, 5*N)` with `N` an attacker byte; overruns the canary (N>=53) and saved LR. Single-path reachable via `INVOKE_CMD(0xF)`. **Blockers:** (a) requires `ctx[0x10]==6`, populated by a display DDC read that tinygrad's driver never triggers (no display-core IP); (b) the stack canary is a per-TA-load TRNG value, and every wrong guess hangs the PSP (needs a power cycle) and re-randomises — so no leak and no brute force. Full detail: `VULN-HDCP-TA-STACK-OVERFLOW.md`, `DISTINCT-WRITE-HUNT.md`, `READ-PRIMITIVE-HUNT-HDCP.md` (both HDCP read/write sweeps came back negative — no canary-leak primitive exists in HDCP's reachable surface). ### 4.2 ASD `0x202` canary leak + `0x301` 5 KB write — real, NOT reachable `0x202` returns an uninitialised stack `src[4]` (containing the ASD canary) to the caller; `0x301` is a clean content-controlled write. Both are excellent primitives, gated only by opcode plumbing: ASD refuses host `INVOKE_CMD` (`0x4` for every id), and no TA forwards `0x202`/`0x301` in any of 10 archived builds. `VULN-ASD-202-CANARY-LEAK.md`, `DISTINCT-WRITE-HUNT.md`. ### 4.3 ASD `0x308` — validate-then-recompute OOB, gated Length re-derived from copied bytes after a bounded first copy; the fail-open signature gate is unreachable in practice (hardware: the write branch never fires; the observable effect is a source over-read). `VULN-ASD-308-BYPASS.md`, `VULN-ASD-308-REACHABLE.md`. ### 4.4 HDCP session-state bypass (DTM→HDCP) — state confusion, not corruption `VULN-HDCP-SESSION-STATE-BYPASS.md`, `VULN-HDCP-BRANCHB-HANGFREE-OOB.md`. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 5. Firmware rollback and version-diff results **Firmware rollback works with no SPI access.** The host supplies sOS/SYS_DRV to the PSP over the bootloader mailbox on every cold boot; substituting a signed older `psp_13_0_0_sos.bin` from linux-firmware and power-cycling boots the older build. Confirmed on hardware booting `0.49.0.51` (version register read back `0x00310033`), reversible, no anti-rollback observed across ~12 cycles. `CONFIRMED-FIRMWARE-ROLLBACK-WORKS.md`. A full symbol-port divergence diff across all archived builds (`VERSION-AUDIT-STATUS.md`) found exactly **three security fixes** between the oldest builds and `.54`: | fix | reach when rolled back | severity | |---|---|---| | **SYS_DRV TMR range guard** (`sysdrv_tee_map_shared_mem`) | host-reachable | **DoS only** — see 5.1 | | **sOS CCP MMIO window guard** (`sos_check_va_window_request`) | needs a non-TA process | near-zero (TAs cannot reach the SVCs it guards) — added in **.52** | | **sOS `bl_derive_key` zeroing** | TA-facing | 4-byte kernel-stack leak to a TA | `FINDING-SYSDRV-SHAREDMEM-RANGE-FIXED-IN-54.md`, `FINDING-SOS-CCP-WINDOW-FIXED-IN-54.md`, `METHODOLOGY-INLINING-VS-ADDED-GUARDS.md` (re-audit of all three; all stand). ### 5.1 The TMR range primitive — fully characterised as DoS On `<= .51`, `SETUP_TMR` accepts a TMR base overlapping the PSP's protected-DRAM window. Traced end to end on hardware: the accepting path DMAs SPI-ROM firmware regions to `base + offset`. But (a) on this consumer card those regions are empty (`0xFF`), (b) the destination is host-chosen but the content is not attacker-controlled, and (c) a 4 GB base sweep found every reachable-safe destination inert (uniform success, PSP alive). The register block that *might* differ is brick-risk and excluded. **Net: DoS only, no disclosure, no useful corruption.** `VULN-CONFIRMED-TMR-RANGE-ROLLBACK.md`. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 6. DRAM trust model (hardware-verified) Everything the PSP reads from host-mutable DRAM is protected: * **TMR** (persistent trusted state): memory-controller fence — host reads return `0xFF`, writes are dropped (verified live). * **Command/ring buffers**: re-validated per use (`validate_client_range`, snapshot-then-parse in `tee_cmd_dispatch`). * **TA / IP-FW images**: signature-verified, code copied to SRAM before execution (no post-verify TOCTOU). No path was found where sOS or a TA reads host-mutable DRAM and trusts its contents for a security decision without one of these protections. `VULN-CONFIRMED-TMR-RANGE-ROLLBACK.md` (fence test), `AUDIT-SOS-SRC-POINTER-TOCTOU.md`. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 7. Retracted claims (kept for the reasoning trail) Honesty matters more than a clean scoreboard; several hypotheses were disproved: * **SYSDRV LOAD_IP_FW / VCCC "double-fetch"** — the handlers dereference sOS's private snapshot, not host memory. No TOCTOU. `FINDING-SYSDRV-VCCC-DOUBLEFETCH-UNDERFLOW.md` (retracted), `LEAD-SYSDRV-LOADIPFW-DOUBLEFETCH.md` (retracted), `AUDIT-SOS-SRC-POINTER-TOCTOU.md` (the corrected conclusion). * **"Live version is .53"** — a stale cache file mistaken for the loaded image; it is `.54`. `FINDING-LIVE-VERSION-IS-53-NOT-54.md` (retracted). * **C2P mailbox "reachable with corrected encoding"** — falsified on hardware; the runtime responder is a NAK stub. `ATTACK-SURFACE.md`. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 8. Tooling produced (reusable) * `import_symbols.py` + `symbols/*.json` — re-apply all reversed symbols/structs. * `vport2.py` / `vport_emit.py` / `vdiff2.py` — cross-version symbol-port diff with two false-positive modes fixed (index window + inline-literal-pool) and a fuzzy threshold. Note: it *misses* genuinely-new boilerplate (use an opcode census for templated functions). * `probes/` — hardware probes and PoCs, each self-documenting. * `psp_recover.py` — PCIe power-cycle recovery (needed after a PSP hang and before any rollback/DMA experiment). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## 9. If continuing The reachable memory-corruption surface is exhausted. Genuine next directions are changes of goal, not continuations: 1. Port minimal display-core init to satisfy the HDCP overflow's `ctx[0x10]==6` gate (large, but makes 4.1 live — still canary-blocked afterward). 2. Physical / SPI attacks (flash the VBIOS directly) or the boot chain (SPL/KDB parsing, pre-fence) — different tooling than the runtime harness. 3. Re-audit older TA builds' *reachable* handlers for a fixed bug (ASD version diff was negative; other TAs not fully swept per-version).