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| author | user <user@clank> | 2026-10-08 16:30:08 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | user <user@clank> | 2026-10-08 16:30:08 +0200 |
| commit | 4bf30ca9cf2fd2ad0f625ef665c7243fa0056701 (patch) | |
| tree | 7533bf0241466a0a8e9d8b42573cc30b2edc9efd | |
| parent | re-evaluate GCP attack surface (post-retraction): capability-capped SYS_DRV r... (diff) | |
| download | amd-psp-re-4bf30ca9cf2fd2ad0f625ef665c7243fa0056701.tar.gz amd-psp-re-4bf30ca9cf2fd2ad0f625ef665c7243fa0056701.tar.xz amd-psp-re-4bf30ca9cf2fd2ad0f625ef665c7243fa0056701.zip | |
crypto output read-back: principle OK (create handle), but RNG 'identical output' was STALE GCP memory
Follow-up to the hijack retraction. Pointing a crypto op output at GCP memory clear of the ROP chain
should let us read engine output back. Principle validated by op 0x01 create: handle 0x10 read back
via the message copy-back = a confirmed crypto output read-back.
RNG (op 0x35) data-buffer demo BLOCKED: output->0x410500 (len 4 and 32) gate-rejects (status
0xffff000f = dword_E1DF48 buffer-gate fail) -> RNG never wrote. Decisive control: a create baseline
(writes nothing to 0x410500) dumped the SAME bytes bb18bb63... as the RNG runs across 3 boots. So the
'identical random-looking output' is STALE GCP memory at 0x410500, NOT RNG output -> the deterministic-
seed hypothesis does not apply (RNG didn't run). 0x410500 is GCP-mapped (dump reads it) but SVC 0xB5
rejects it as an op-0x35 OUTPUT buffer; earlier single-op ptr_sweep accepted op0x35->0x410500 len4 at
status 0, so the gate accept/reject is harness/len/state-sensitive, not yet pinned. Updated harness doc.
| -rw-r--r-- | fw/HARNESS-GCP-CRYPTO-ROP.md | 24 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fw/HARNESS-GCP-CRYPTO-ROP.md b/fw/HARNESS-GCP-CRYPTO-ROP.md index 6a87adf..e58ce49 100644 --- a/fw/HARNESS-GCP-CRYPTO-ROP.md +++ b/fw/HARNESS-GCP-CRYPTO-ROP.md @@ -111,3 +111,27 @@ its result inline in the message, or (b) defeating the cross-domain buffer bounc where the SYS_DRV handler actually dereferences it) -- neither available as-is. This is the accurate boundary of the GCP->SYS_DRV crypto surface: inline-result ops work end-to-end; buffer-I/O ops execute but their data does not cross back. + +================================================================================ +## Reading crypto OUTPUT back via GCP shared memory -- principle OK, RNG demo blocked + +Follow-up to the retraction: since the crypto buffer write lands in GCP's own shared memory, pointing +an op's output at GCP memory CLEAR of the ROP chain should let us read the engine output back. + +* **Principle validated** by `TEE_AllocateOperation` (op 0x01): it returns the context handle `0x10` + inline, and we read it back from GCP memory via the message copy-back. That is a confirmed crypto + output read-back. +* **RNG (op 0x35) data-buffer demo: blocked.** Pointed op 0x35 output at `0x410500` (clear of the + chain), len 4 and 32, dumped `0x410500`. Result: `status = 0xffff000f` (crypto dispatcher + buffer-gate reject, `dword_E1DF48`) -- the RNG never wrote. Decisive control: a `create` baseline + (writes nothing to `0x410500`) dumped the SAME bytes `bb18bb63 aa3069a5 ...` as the RNG runs, across + 3 boots. +* **=> the "identical random-looking output" is STALE GCP memory at `0x410500`, not RNG output.** The + seeded/deterministic-RNG hypothesis does not apply -- the RNG did not run. (`0x410500` reads fine + from GCP context, so it is GCP-mapped; but `SVC 0xB5` rejects it as an op-0x35 OUTPUT buffer -- the + earlier single-op `ptr_sweep` accepted `0x410500` for op 0x35 len 4 at status 0, so the gate's + accept/reject is harness/len/state-sensitive and not yet pinned.) + +Open: to demo a data-crypto output read-back, resolve why `SVC 0xB5` rejects the op-0x35 output buffer +here (window/direction/len), or use an op whose output buffer the gate accepts, then dump it and +compare against a no-write baseline to prove it is engine output (not stale). |
