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* fw: SVC surface of the new TAs -- GCP forwards ASD 0x202, overturning a ↵user2026-09-29
standing negative Added fw/ta_svc_scan.py, which enumerates every SVC site per TA and recovers service-2/service-1 RPC opcodes from the store into req[0], per the ABI in GUARD-INIT-CHAIN.md. Validated against HDCP first: 49 svc 0xF2 sites, matching the count in the original 89-site audit, with service-1 opcodes matching its documented list. The result that matters: VULN-ASD-202-CANARY-LEAK.md rates the ASD canary disclosure not host-reachable on three axes, the load-bearing one being that no host-reachable TA forwards opcode 0x202. That scan covered ASD, HDCP, DTM and RAS, the only TAs known at the time. GCP contains a thunk at 0x405446 that sets req[0]=0x202 and service 2 and issues svc 0xF2, and it is called from two host-invokable GCP commands, cmd04 GetContentKey at 0x4037e8 and cmdFE02 at 0x403c42. OPM likewise emits ASD 0x301, the 5120-byte content-controlled write that was dismissed only because nothing emitted it. So that axis is now false: GCP and OPM are measured host-invokable on this card and they reach ASD opcodes the four-TA scan concluded nobody reaches. Deliberately not claimed: a host-visible leak. ASD 0x202 copies its sixteen uninitialised stack bytes to a caller-supplied pointer, and the caller here is GCP, so the canary lands in GCP's buffer; host visibility requires GCP to copy that region into its response, which is the next step. Also recorded as a warning attached to the result: the scan's resumable sweep can fabricate instructions, and an earlier pass reported this very movw from a misaligned window. Every opcode quoted for GCP and OPM was re-verified by disassembling from a function boundary, and the call sites by disassembling around them; the rest of the table is leads until checked the same way.