|
|
standing negative
Added fw/ta_svc_scan.py, which enumerates every SVC site per TA and recovers
service-2/service-1 RPC opcodes from the store into req[0], per the ABI in
GUARD-INIT-CHAIN.md. Validated against HDCP first: 49 svc 0xF2 sites, matching
the count in the original 89-site audit, with service-1 opcodes matching its
documented list.
The result that matters: VULN-ASD-202-CANARY-LEAK.md rates the ASD canary
disclosure not host-reachable on three axes, the load-bearing one being that no
host-reachable TA forwards opcode 0x202. That scan covered ASD, HDCP, DTM and
RAS, the only TAs known at the time. GCP contains a thunk at 0x405446 that sets
req[0]=0x202 and service 2 and issues svc 0xF2, and it is called from two
host-invokable GCP commands, cmd04 GetContentKey at 0x4037e8 and cmdFE02 at
0x403c42. OPM likewise emits ASD 0x301, the 5120-byte content-controlled write
that was dismissed only because nothing emitted it.
So that axis is now false: GCP and OPM are measured host-invokable on this card
and they reach ASD opcodes the four-TA scan concluded nobody reaches.
Deliberately not claimed: a host-visible leak. ASD 0x202 copies its sixteen
uninitialised stack bytes to a caller-supplied pointer, and the caller here is
GCP, so the canary lands in GCP's buffer; host visibility requires GCP to copy
that region into its response, which is the next step.
Also recorded as a warning attached to the result: the scan's resumable sweep can
fabricate instructions, and an earlier pass reported this very movw from a
misaligned window. Every opcode quoted for GCP and OPM was re-verified by
disassembling from a function boundary, and the call sites by disassembling
around them; the rest of the table is leads until checked the same way.
|