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* [HW] a working ROP chain: 4 self-chaining strb gadgets write R0P! to the ↵user2026-10-08
command buffer Addendum F pivoted SP into the command buffer; this runs an actual chain from there with a readback effect, not just a terminal fault. Chain: first pop sets r4=params+0x2000, pc=0x40371d; the pivot gadget mov sp,r4;pop{..pc} moves SP to params+0x2000; then the self-chaining gadget 0x402266 strb r4,[r5];pop{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,pc} runs four times, each fed a (byte,address) pair and the next pc from the buffer, then a terminal sentinel pc 0x00bada54. Result on silicon: marker @ params+0x3000 = b'R0P!' (was 0xBB fill), FSR=0x5 faultaddr=0x00bada54. Both confirmations hold -- four strb executed in order with chosen value and chosen address each, and control followed the planted sequence to its sentinel end. 0x00bada54 is only in the chain, never on the stack. So end to end, one FE0A selector-4 invoke gives: chosen PC (Add.E), SP pivot into the host command buffer (Add.F), and an arbitrary-length ROP chain doing chosen write-what-where (Add.G). Code injection stays out (no W+X page, report section 5), so payloads remain ROP, but 'arbitrary ROP chaining is a structural ceiling' is now refuted with a running chain. Limits kept honest: byte-store gadget (word-store needs controlled r0..r2, one more pivot); no graceful TEE return yet so each run needs an ATX cycle; no weaponised payload chosen. Updated both documents.