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pane-finder requests three permissions as it loads, so the first press of a
keybinding we ship opened a consent screen instead of a fuzzy finder. Prompting
is right for a wasm you found on the internet and wrong for the ones that come
in our own tarball.
plugin_is_shipped_with_sl0ppi (zellij-utils/src/input/permission.rs) grants
those implicitly, through the same instruction a human "y" produces, so the
plugin's permissions are set and recorded exactly as before. "Ours" is narrow
on purpose:
- builtins, asked via the existing PluginConfig::is_builtin -- the same
predicate check_command_permission already uses to exempt them, so the two
cannot drift;
- files inside a plugin directory we install into: the config dir's plugins/
and the data dir's plugins/;
- nothing else. Remote plugins are never trusted, paths are normalised
lexically first so plugins/../../evil.wasm is not "inside" the dir, and the
directories are derived from the environment and default locations -- so
getting them wrong costs a prompt and can never grant one elsewhere.
The trade, documented in config/README.md: <config dir>/plugins/ is now a
trusted directory. Anything able to write there can already bind arbitrary
commands to a key in config.kdl, so a consent screen for the wasm beside it was
not buying anything -- but it does mean plugins/ is not a download folder.
packaging/checks/plugin-permissions-live.py drives both halves on a real
session: the shipped plugin must run without the prompt, and the SAME wasm
loaded from outside the plugin dir must still ask. Confirmed by disabling the
rule and watching the first half fail with the exact "asks permission to ...
Allow? (y/n)" screen it was written against.
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Completes the two pieces deferred from the first workspace-hints pass.
`zellij run --purpose X` / `zellij action new-pane --purpose X` tag a pane at
spawn time, which is what an agent wants for panes it creates itself; the OSC
wrapper still works for programs that declare their own role. Not supported with
--in-place, which replaces another pane rather than being a pane of its own: clap
rejects the combination rather than accepting a flag that would do nothing.
`tab name="work" purpose="agent-work"` gives a whole tab a role, reported by
`list-tabs --json`. It rides the tab's ROOT layout node, reusing the pane field
because a tab's root is the tab container and never itself a pane -- asserted by a
test for the tightest case (a tab holding exactly one pane), since a leak there
would silently mislabel a pane.
The interesting part is why the flag first shipped broken. There are TWO protobuf
boundaries -- the plugin API and the client->server IPC contract -- and a CLI flag
must cross the second one. Defaulting the field in the conversion (what "no
protoc" usually forces) compiles cleanly and then silently drops the value in
transit, so --purpose parsed, printed a pane id, and did nothing. Fixed by adding
the field to both contracts by hand, in the .proto AND the committed generated
prost, kept in lockstep so a future regeneration reproduces it: protoc is only
needed to regenerate, not to build. Both boundaries now have a round-trip test,
and the IPC one was confirmed to fail when the wire read is removed.
Sanitising moved to Grid::set_authoritative_purpose, the single choke point every
out-of-band source passes through, after the CLI path was observed delivering
`bad purpose; rm -rf /` intact into list-panes --json.
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Squashed import of upstream zellij at 0e6e4404 ("Support the Kitty Image
Protocol (#5428)"), the merge-base our fork was developed against. Upstream's
3311 commits are deliberately NOT replayed here; only our own fork commits are,
so the monorepo stays small and `git log sl0ppij/` shows sl0p work, not zellij's
entire history.
Upstream provenance is tracked in FORKS.md and can always be re-fetched from
https://github.com/zellij-org/zellij.
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